August 15, 2015

Brock International Prize in Education
2021 S. Lewis, Suite 415
Tulsa, OK 74104-5733

Dear Colleagues:

It is a great pleasure to nominate Nel Noddings for the Brock International Prize in Education. I first became acquainted with Dr. Noddings’ work when I was a master’s degree student at the University of Vermont. I was a student in Higher Education and Student Affairs Administration and became very interested in ethics and moral philosophy. In a course in Professional Ethics in Spring 1992, Dr. Robert Nash introduced us to the standard philosophical traditions and then put before us a book unlike any other, one that had been published just a few years before—Noddings’ 1984 book, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. By that time I had read the moral development theory of Carol Gilligan (In a Different Voice, from 1982) and was intrigued by the feminist critique of the psychological research that was so foundational to educational research and practice at the time.

As students, we were prepared for a challenging critique to male-dominated ethics. What I didn’t realize was how profound I would find Noddings’ work, that I would come to study with one of her students (Lynda Stone, at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), and that her basic critique of male-dominated, Western ethical theory would influence a good portion of my future teaching and future scholarship.

In this letter, I summarize from my point of view the impact that Nel Noddings’ theory of ethical caring has had on educational practice, scholarship, and philosophy. I believe that her theory of caring is a powerful innovation that has been broadly influential in education and I am pleased that Nel Noddings is being considered for the Brock Prize.

Nel Noddings has had a similar impact on at least two generations of education scholars. After going to graduate school for my doctorate, I would appreciate how revolutionary and iconoclastic her work on Caring was when she first began to present it to her colleagues in philosophy of education. Dr. Nash, an accomplished ethicist, had indicated to us how radically different Noddings’ work was, compared to what others in the field were writing at the time, and how critically it had been received. As a community of scholars, philosophy of education used to be dominated nearly completely by men. It reflects the near complete dominance in philosophy by the Anglo-American approach of analytic philosophy up until the 1970s. Quite often anthologies of analytic philosophy include no women at all. Following the great Maxine Greene, who recently passed away, and Jane Roland Martin, Nel
Noddings broke into the male-dominated Philosophy of Education Society. She opened the door for a dramatically expanded and enriched scope of inquiry in the Society and encouraged new forms of inquiry embedded in women’s experience, feminist theory, and other critical social theory. As time has passed, among philosophers of education of the last 35 years, in my estimation there have been none more influential than Nel Noddings.

Noddings’ theory of caring is fundamentally different from most ethical theory in that she rejects the grounds for the predominant ethical tradition—the deontological ethical tradition exemplified by Immanuel Kant. In deontological ethics, universal rules and principles define the good. Through right reason, the moral actor determines the right course of action by the moral principle that it serves. In this kind of ethics, abstract, disinterested reasoning determines right action. This ethical theory provides the foundation for much developmental theory (including the moral development theory that Lawrence Kohlberg developed and Carol Gilligan critiqued).

Noddings and Gilligan thought that abstract reasoning was not the only way to reason ethically. Connection or relation seemed to them to be important, but relation was not something that was accounted for in dominant ethical theory. In Kant’s (and Kohlberg’s) theory, connection is something that must be overcome. The moral actor in their ethics is the autonomous actor who sets personal interests and loyalties aside.

Gilligan knew from her close work with Kohlberg that his stage theory was developed from research he had done all with men. Later, when he and his fellow researchers studied the moral development of women, they found that women seemed to be mired in intermediate stages. Gilligan, setting out to study moral development from women’s experience, rather than assuming that the research with men was universally applicable, found an alternate trajectory of moral development based upon caring and relation.

Inspired by the model of Gilligan’s approach, Noddings developed an ethical philosophy in a similar way, drawing from what she called a feminine experience (Noddings indicates in her work that she’s not sure if her theorizing is feminist, and in the latest edition of Caring, a key word in the subtitle of her book changes from “Feminine” to “Relational”). Instead of an ethics based on rules, principles, and disinterested reasoning, Noddings developed an ethics based on “natural caring,” an inherent connection between persons, the paradigm example being the experience of the mother and the child. She argued that all caring draws from our experience of being both one who cares (which she names as the one-caring) and those cared for (the cared-for). The one-caring has no need for abstract principles, Noddings argued, but instead draws from relational experience. Instead of serving abstract principles drawn from reasoning, the one-caring works to enrich relation.

Importantly for Noddings, the one-caring is not a martyr, self-sacrificing all cares and interests to the needs of the cared-for. Noddings also argues that the cared-for reciprocate, completing the relation by acknowledging the caring.

Caring theory has a direct application to teaching. The one-caring makes a compelling model for the educator. It is not that the teacher needs to see each student as being in a relation of natural caring – that would be impossible, Noddings argues, and not something we could expect of anyone. In relations such as these, the teacher turns to “ethical caring,” acting with respect to the relation to students, drawing from the memory of natural caring.
The relation itself is the focus, so the teacher works on two things – motivational displacement and engrossment – in order to serve the relation. In a teaching context, motivational displacement means not making students do something because the teacher needs it done, and engrossment means taking the time learning the needs and wishes of the students. A relevant application today is high-stakes testing. Noddings writes in *When School Reform Goes Wrong* (2007) that when accountability for test scores drives educational practice, teachers are encouraged to do what it takes to raise scores, not necessarily what is best for children. Noddings theory of caring provides an alternative language to talk about educational practice, grounded in responsibility for the needs and wishes of students.

Caring is undoubtedly hard work. But attending to ethical caring can lead to more experiences of natural caring. The teacher also provides opportunities for the students to be responsive to the relation in order to sustain the relation. Otherwise, the teacher’s ethical caring will turn to drudgery and becoming too draining. Whereas Kant would praise the teacher who serves duty above all else, Noddings’ theory attends more to the kinds of interactions and places that schools should be. Further, it’s important for students to experience caring relations with the adults in school, places where rigid and uncaring practices are quite often experienced by students. This she argues is of paramount importance to moral education and the cultivation of a compassionate citizenry.

In addition to the great challenge she presented to traditional ethics, Noddings took some heat from some feminist scholars who argued that she made it seem like women were supposed to be self-sacrificing or that she was essentializing women’s experience. In *Caring*, she was careful to make the point that she believed that men were capable and could be quite accomplished at the role of one-caring, but that what she was doing was drawing from an experience that was largely feminine in the world in which she lived, an experience that had heretofore not been considered to be a valid source for theorizing about ethics. She has also been critiqued by those who object to the ways in which her theory could be taken to aggrandize a privileged, white, middle-class experience. Over the years I have periodically heard similar comments, sometimes from scholars but mostly from graduate students having an initial reaction to the kinds of examples Noddings uses from her own life. The theory itself has broad applicability beyond the examples drawn from the particular social location in which she has lived and has influenced compelling scholarship more broadly.

From that initial theory, Noddings has articulated how this ethical theory can contribute to a whole range of philosophical ideas, educational ideas, and educational practices. In 1992, Noddings came out with *The Challenge to Care in Schools*, in which she imagined how her caring theory could be used as a basis for a whole school curriculum. Taking seriously the concerns for care that the theory inspires, Noddings calls for no less than a complete rethinking of schooling. Over time, a chief target of her work has been pointless standardization. A math teacher by background and a strong advocate of high-quality math education, she is nevertheless convinced that some forms of math, particularly advanced math, are not relevant to many students for whom it holds no interest. She would rather see math adapted in meaningful ways rather than everyone being forced to master the same standard curriculum in the higher grades.
Another feminist work, *Women and Evil*, used care theory to arrive at an alternate definition for evil (anything that causes needless pain, separation, or anxiety). In this book, she argued against tradition that placed women and women’s experience in the role of evil and/or inferiority.

There are other applications of Noddings’ caring theory. Caring forms the basis for her intriguing philosophical book on the good life, *Happiness and Education*, and a compelling book about social policy, *Starting at Home*. She also wrote a thoughtful book on the cultivation of spirituality, *Educating for Intelligent Belief and Unbelief*.

In more recent work, Noddings has applied caring theory to new issues. One is an excellent update on the value of education for promoting democracy, *Education and Democracy for the 21st Century*. She also wrote *Peace Education: How We Come to Love and Hate War* and *Educating Citizens for Global Awareness*, which has opened up her work to new, more global audiences.

Her other books include the edited book *Justice and Caring*; the contributions in this book showed how notions of caring and social justice need not be placed in opposition. Another edited book, *Stories Lives Tell*, explored the power of women’s narratives. She has also published three editions of *Philosophy of Education*, currently the most popular textbook for philosophy of education classes.

It’s hard to overestimate the impact of Noddings’ work. She has opened up new and different conversations about what counts as philosophy, returning philosophy to its roots as the “love of wisdom” and making it more inspiring and more applicable to educational practice than it had been for decades. And beyond philosophy of education, she has inspired many educational theorists, researchers, and educators. In 2012, Robert Lake edited a tribute book, *Dear Nel: Opening the Circles of Care (Letters to Nel Noddings)*. Included in this portfolio is the table of contents from that book, in which 50 authors address Noddings to explain her influence on them. I have also included the Foreword by David Berliner, who writes:

> In this age of widespread criticism of the public schools, disdain for the teachers who staff them, and amnesia about the nature of youth, genuine caring between all the parties involved in our schools seems to be in quite short supply. ... You have made many of us think a little more deeply about educational issues and you have moved some in our nation a little closer to design a better system of education for our children. (pp. ix, xii)

Ever since *Caring* was first published, Noddings has been highly sought after as a guest lecturer throughout the country. In retirement, she maintains a stunning schedule of guest appearances. The longer version of her vita, which I have not included in the portfolio, indicates that she has spoken at 8-12 engagements each year and as many as 16 in a year. She told me a few weeks ago that eventually she stopped listing speaking engagements on her vita, so even the list that I had was incomplete.

The esteem she is held by her colleagues is evident in her election to five presidencies. She was president of the National Academy of Education 2001-2005, one of the most esteemed positions in educational research. She has been president of these professional associations: the Philosophy of Education Society, the John Dewey Society, the Far West Philosophy of Education Society, and the California Association for Philosophy of
Education. She was also acting dean of the College of Education at Stanford University 1992-1994.

Please find in this portfolio:
1. My nomination letter
2. Nel Noddings’ official short biography
3. Letter from David Hansen, Professor at Columbia University Teachers College, New York
4. Letter from Richard Yoshimachi, President, Ikeda Center for Peace, Learning, and Dialogue, Cambridge, Massachusetts
5. Excerpt from *Fifty Modern Thinkers on Education*:
   Table of Contents listing honorees and David Flinders’ summary of Nel Noddings
6. Excerpts from *Dear Nel: Opening the Circles of Care (Letters to Nel Noddings)*:
   Table of Contents, David Berliner’s Foreword, and selections from the chapter, “Circles of Scholarship.”
7. Nel Noddings’ curriculum vita
8. Listing of dissertations advised by Nel Noddings at Stanford University and Columbia University

I also invite you to look at the first two of these videos. The third is a more extended, recent lecture.

Nel Noddings introducing her ethics of care (3 minutes)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7rYDDot3W7k

Interview at Arizona State University (3 minutes)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tk9isLA_ODA

Teaching in the 21st Century, keynote address at the University of New Mexico (65 minutes)
https://vimeo.com/21937823

I look forward to seeing you all in Tulsa.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Michael G. Gunzenhauser
Associate Dean, School of Education
Associate Professor, Administrative and Policy Studies
mgunzen@pitt.edu
Nel Noddings is Lee L. Jacks Professor of Education, Emerita, at Stanford University. She is a past president of the National Academy of Education, the Philosophy of Education Society and the John Dewey Society. In addition to nineteen books—among them, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, Women and Evil, The Challenge to Care in Schools, Educating for Intelligent Belief or Unbelief, and Philosophy of Education*—she is the author of more than 200 articles and chapters on various topics ranging from the ethics of care to mathematical problem solving. Her latest books are *Happiness and Education, Educating Citizens for Global Awareness, Critical Lessons: What Our Schools Should Teach, When School Reform Goes Wrong,* and *The Maternal Factor: Two Paths to Morality, Peace Education, and Education and Democracy in the 21st Century.* Another book, *A Richer, Brighter Vision for American High Schools,* will soon appear with Cambridge University Press. Her work has so far been translated into 12 languages.

Noddings spent fifteen years as a teacher, administrator, and curriculum supervisor in public schools; she served as a mathematics department chairperson in New Jersey and as Director of the Laboratory Schools at the University of Chicago. At Stanford, she received the Award for Teaching Excellence three times. She also served as Associate Dean and as Acting Dean at Stanford for four years.

She is a Laureate member of Kappa Delta Pi, and holds a number of awards, among them the Anne Rowe Award for contributions to the education of women (Harvard University); the Willystine Goodsell Award for contributions to the education of women (AERA); Medal for Distinguished Service, Teachers College Columbia U.; Lifetime Achievement Award from AERA (Division B); the Award for Distinguished Leadership in Education, Rutgers University; and honorary doctorates from Columbia College; Montclair State University; Queen’s University, Canada; Lewis and Clark College; and Manhattan College. *Education and Democracy in the 21st Century* has been named Outstanding Book of the Year by AACTE.


Full CV available on request
3 Webb Ave.
Ocean Grove, NJ 07756
August 15, 2015

Brock International Prize in Education
2021 S. Lewis, Suite 415
Tulsa, OK 74104-5733

Dear members of the review committee:

It is a great honor to endorse the nomination of Dr. Nel Noddings for the Brock International Prize in Education. I have known Dr. Noddings for nearly thirty years. I first met her when I was a doctoral student at the University of Chicago, not long after the publication of her pioneering book in moral philosophy, *Caring*. I have followed her career closely since that time. I have heard her deliver numerous keynote lectures; have kept abreast of her evolving philosophical research (not always easy to do given how prolific she has been); and have interacted with her in person more times than I can remember. I believe I know her and her scholarship well.

Dr. Noddings is without question one of the most original and influential scholars of education of the 20th-21st centuries. While I deeply admire other senior colleagues such Dr. Linda Darling-Hammond, Dr. Philip W. Jackson (recently deceased), Dr. Gloria Ladson-Billings, and Dr. Lee Shulman – among other sterling colleagues – I rank nobody in higher terms than Dr. Noddings. Her work over the years on caring has become one of the most oft-cited research programs in the history of educational inquiry. Her framework has been adopted by countless scholars conducting both empirical and philosophical research. Moreover, as with her oeuvre on caring, her subsequent published work on questions of global justice, of happiness, of a humane and effective system of education, and more, has reverberated across the entire spectrum of educational research and practice.

Alongside her influential scholarship, Dr. Noddings has served as a dynamic teacher, mentor, and leader across numerous educational fields. She is generous with her time, her energy, and her spirit, even as she has published one noteworthy book after another. Dr. Noddings is a luminary, an educational scholar whose voice has been timely, forceful, and deeply formative. I am grateful to have had the opportunity to commend her to you for the Brock Prize.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

David T. Hansen, Ph.D.
Director and Weinberg Professor in the Historical and Philosophical Foundations of Education
August 6, 2015

Dr. Ed Harris
Chairperson, Brock Prize Executive Committee
Oklahoma State University
College of Education
Stillwater, OK 74078

Dear Dr. Harris,

It is an honor to write this letter in support of the nomination of Nel Noddings for the 2016 Brock Prize. Dr. Noddings is a valued friend of and advisor to our organization, the Ikeda Center for Peace, Learning, and Dialogue. Founded in 1993, and located in Cambridge, Massachusetts, we engage scholars and others in the search for the ideas and solutions that will assist in the peaceful evolution of humanity. Much of our work focuses on and promotes humanistic education, especially as articulated by John Dewey and the Japanese educator and philosopher Tsunesaburo Makiguchi, whose pedagogy of “value creation,” known as Soka education, closely parallels American constructivist or progressive educational thought and practice. Articulating such cross-cultural resonances is one of our core pursuits.

Dr. Noddings’ involvement with the Ikeda Center is varied. She is a member of the advisory council of our Education Fellows program, which supports doctoral work on any aspect of the philosophy and practice of Soka education, including its relationship with other pedagogies. She also served as editor of our multi-author book Educating Citizens for Global Awareness, and has been a featured speaker at Ikeda Center events.

That Dr. Noddings is able to contribute so well and in so many ways to our work is evidence of her accomplishment as an educator and scholar, as well as the robust capacity of the relational ethic of caring to be germane in a number of contexts. Here are some of the ways that Dr. Noddings has used the frame of care ethics to enrich our understanding of our peace and dialogue work.

As a speaker at our 2009 Ikeda Forum, “John Dewey, Daisaku Ikeda, and the Quest for a New Humanism,” Dr. Noddings commented on our current public education environment with the observation that we have drifted far from Dewey’s belief that “to find out what one is fitted to do and secure it is the key to happiness,” adding that our failure “to give kids that chance to find out” is nothing less than a moral failure. This insight clarified for us how and why our work is relevant in today’s educational environment of narrowly defined achievement.
During a 2014 interview with the Ikeda Center she introduced readers to the concept of moral injury, which contends that when we speak of PTSD we must consider a subtle distinction, namely that some soldiers suffer not just from the violence of war but from the loss of moral identity that can result when they are asked to do things that they never imagined themselves doing. In these cases, the responsibility is with the citizenry whose government puts them in these tragic circumstances, and not just with the military chain of command. We believe her sensitivity to this issue is a manifestation of the ethics of care. To acknowledge moral injury, each citizen must claim his or her relationship with the soldier.

In the same interview, Dr. Noddings explained that the ethics of care, based as it is on relationships, which are inherently messy and ambiguous, is a safeguard against the narrow dogmatism that hinders the quest for global peace and wellbeing. She reinforced for us that while it is important for us to maintain our Buddhist philosophical foundation, our work requires openness to the contributions of all faiths and philosophies.

As editor of Educating Citizens for Global Awareness, Dr. Noddings took care to counter the prevailing assumption that globalization is merely a function of economics, and that it not be defined from the vantage point of the most powerful among us. We considered Dr. Noddings an ideal editor for the project since the relational ethic of caring is such a good fit with the Buddhist concept of dependent origination, or interdependence, that is one of the core Buddhist precepts that drive our work for peace, learning, and dialogue.

These snapshots attest to the sturdiness and flexibility of care ethics as a mode of educational and social engagement. We are grateful that Dr. Noddings has shared so much of her wisdom and expertise with us. And we are certain that the community of teachers and learners, understood in the broadest sense, has benefited greatly from Dr. Noddings’ groundbreaking, compassionate, and extraordinarily well-conceived philosophy of education.

Best regards,

Richard Yoshimachi
President
FIFTY MODERN THINKERS ON EDUCATION

From Piaget to the Present

Edited by Joy A. Palmer
Advisory Editors: Liora Bresler and David E. Cooper

London and New York
NEL NODDINGS 1929–

Interest in preserving the lives of our children and fostering their individual growth provides a compelling interest in moral life and moral education.¹

Like other noted philosophers, Nel Noddings has contributed to a range of educational scholarship. In particular, the topics of her work revolve around the analysis of caring and its place in ethics,² the development of school structures that encourage caring relations,³ efforts to reconceptualize evil from the standpoint of women,⁴ and the use of maternal interests to inform moral education.⁵ The wide influence of Noddings’ work hinges on her broad conceptions of moral reasoning, values and belief. Moreover, her contributions have come at a critical juncture in contemporary debates over education. Recent trends have bolstered a lively interest in moral life and moral development. However, opportunities to affirm the ethical foundations of teaching and learning are also threatened by politically motivated calls for schools to reassert the narrow and often nostalgic views of a particular group. Against this threatened partisanship, Noddings provides an understanding of ethical belief that is both more rigorous and more inclusive than we would otherwise have today.

Noddings began her professional career as a mathematics teacher after graduating from Montclair State College in New Jersey. Her first teaching position was with a sixth-grade class, but she went on to teach high school mathematics for twelve years. School had played a central role in Noddings’ life as a student herself, and her early experiences with caring teachers contributed to a career-long interest in student–teacher relations. Her academic passions, first mathematics and later philosophy, also originated in her admiration for the teachers who taught them, and only afterwards in the demands of the subject matter itself.⁶

Noddings completed her masters degree in mathematics at Rutgers University. She also served as a school and district administrator before continuing her graduate work at Stanford University. After completing her doctoral degree in educational philosophy and theory, Noddings was hired in 1975 to direct the University of Chicago’s Laboratory School. As a newly minted philosopher of education, Noddings must have found this position irresistible given the school’s past association with John Dewey, the preeminent American pragmatist whose progressive views have and continue to influence Noddings’ own work. In 1977, Noddings joined the education faculty at Stanford University where she served in all ranks, including as director of Stanford’s teacher education programme and as acting Dean. Noddings received several teaching awards at Stanford, and in 1992 she was appointed to an endowed chair. After retiring from Stanford University, Noddings taught philosophy of education at Teachers College Columbia University until 2000.

Much of Noddings’ early research is in mathematics education, a field to which she has contributed throughout her career. Increasingly, however, philosophy and the study of ethics became the centre of her academic work. Her first book, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education,² contributed to this focus. Noddings begins this book by raising a perennial question: What is the basis for moral action? While many other ethicists have posed the same question, Noddings’ approach differs from philosophical traditions of the past. In particular, she argues that neither of the two major ethical systems — utilitarian and deontological ethics — provide an adequate foundation for understanding the moral dilemmas and ethical concerns of women. Noddings does not reject decisions based on anticipated consequences (a utilitarian approach) or principled reasoning (a deontological approach). Rather, she proposes an alternative perspective grounded in natural caring, as in the care of a mother for a child. Natural caring, Noddings asserts, is a moral attitude, a longing for goodness that arises out of the experience or memory of being cared for. From this basis, Noddings develops the notion of ethical caring, a state of being in relation, characterized by receptivity, relatedness and engrossment.

The strength of Noddings’ approach is its emphasis on reciprocity, a point on which she argues that ethical matters cannot be analysed simply from the perspective of an individual agent acting out of duty or in accordance with some abstract principle. Instead, the relation always includes a ‘cared for’, together with his or her interests, motives and affects. In this respect, the approach constantly looks to relations at hand. When principles such as equity and fairness are used to make decisions, their use is derived from a primary concern for persons, dialogue with those persons and the quality of relations that are formed as a result.

Noddings draws on a range of feminist theories to support her analysis, and for this reason she faces challenges similar to the challenges encountered by other feminist scholars. In the case of ethics, moral action is typically described in ‘the language of the father’, Noddings writes, ‘in terms such as justification, fairness, justice’.⁸ Scholars who emphasize maternal interests, however, enter the discussion with what Carol Gilligan called ‘a different voice’.⁹ The challenge of bringing a new voice to an old domain is in presenting a ‘rigorous’ analysis without giving up the very spirit that contributes to the analysis in the first place. The question becomes how to be ‘tough-minded’, so to speak, about concepts that are not strictly empirical or logical in the formal use of these terms.

Noddings meets this challenge in several ways. First, her work consistently acknowledges opposing views. She also explicitly addresses the difficulties that arise in her own analysis of caring — not just the political difficulties noted above but also the analytic difficulties entailed in the theory itself. She discusses, for example, the ways in which reciprocity — a cornerstone of care theory — becomes extremely complex in the types of unequal relationships (e.g., student–teacher) that concern educators most. Issues of time, intensity and situational variations also must be worked out, as do the questions of what it means to care for non-human entities such as plants, animals, ideas and organizations. As her work illustrates, Noddings’ conviction is to think through these complexities as intelligently as possible rather than discard the theory because of them.

Second, Noddings defines her approach as feminine in the classical sense of placing its emphasis on relatedness and receptivity. In part, the aim of doing so is to separate the approach from empirical questions of gender per se. Women, she argues, are clearly capable of the skills that are emphasized in conventional ethics — formal reasoning and the arrangement of principles
hierarchically to arrive at logical conclusions. At the same time, men have no reason to reject caring as a basis for their moral actions. Like women, they too have a vested interest in preserving life, enhancing the quality of relations and fostering individual growth. Sharing these interests, both men and women suffer from an unnecessarily narrow view of ethics.

Third, although Noddings argues that her approach is phenomenological in its method, and thus concerned with epistemology, the purpose of ethical phenomenology is not to ‘prove’ a moral truth. Instead, Noddings proposes that care theorists strive for conceptual knowledge and enlightened understanding, as opposed to formulaic certainty. “The hand that steadied us as we learned to ride our first bicycle”, she writes, “did not provide propositional knowledge, but it guided and supported us all the same, and we finished up ‘knowing how.’”

Noddings’ philosophical analysis of caring was followed in 1989 with *Women and Evil*, a book that added to her reputation as a leading feminist scholar. This work reveals a long-standing yet ambivalent fascination with Judeo-Christian theology, a set of traditions that have defined evil largely in terms of disobedience and sin. Noddings argues that this approach creates the problem of reconciling human miseries with a benevolent and all-powerful God. Moreover, efforts to resolve this problem often mystify evil, and may even contribute to the forms of dominance from which evil may arise. Noddings rejects this approach but not the need for a morality that will help individuals understand and control their own tendencies toward evil. Focusing on the experience of women, she proposes an approach that locates evil in the phenomenological conditions of pain, separation and helplessness. When evil is encountered from this perspective, evil need not be explained away, but simply faced with as much courage as our situations allow. Caring is an important source for this type of courage, serving also as a basis for dialogue and cooperation. In particular, Noddings recommends that caring teachers openly address the spiritual longing and eternal questions of all students, especially students who are socialized or aspire to dominance.

Noddings’ philosophical analyses of caring and evil have made a significant contribution to ethics, phenomenology and feminist scholarship. Another side to her work, however, and one which is equally important, is represented in her recurrent emphasis on the use of philosophy to inform educational practice. This aspect of her scholarship can be labelled transformationist in the sense that Noddings explicitly takes up the aims of transforming the structures of teaching and schooling in ways that will encourage caring relations and the growth of individuals. Concerns that focus on instructional arrangements, curriculum and the profession of teaching coalesce in Noddings’ book *The Challenge to Care in Schools*. From one perspective, this book can be viewed as a critique of liberal education and specifically the traditions that define liberal education as the ‘best’ education for all students. Expanding on her earlier criticisms of Mortimer Adler’s Paideia Proposal, Noddings contends that the standard disciplines of liberal education embrace an overly narrow conception of human rationality, which is based almost entirely on trained intelligence. Her arguments are not simply against requiring all students to take the same courses in mathematics, science, language and so forth, but against any curriculum that ignores the wide range of interests and talents that students develop. Given genuine differences among students, prescribing the same curriculum for everyone only requires teachers to rely on coercion, thus undermining the relationships that are so central to learning and individual growth.

Educational philosophers will recognize the influence of Dewey on these arguments, as well as on the method that Noddings uses for developing an alternative approach. Her method is to engage readers in a complex thought experiment. As parents, Noddings asks, how would we want our children to be educated if they were a large group with differing abilities and talents? Although Dewey’s notion of ‘the best and wisest parent’ has been used (or misused) by the same proponents of liberal education with whom Noddings finds fault, her interpretations shut the notion of an educational elite. Furthermore, this thought experiment is not entirely hypothetical for Noddings, the mother of five daughters and five sons. As she repeatedly acknowledges, raising a large and diverse family is a key source for her convictions that education must be broadly conceived and responsive to the students it is intended to benefit.

Noddings’ proposal is to organize school curriculum around centres of care, a departure from the standard disciplines that Dewey was unwilling to make. Nevertheless, Noddings and Dewey would agree on another point. While both philosophers favour that education be tailored to student interests, they equally oppose differentiating curriculum on the basis of perceived social or occupational needs. Such forms of tracking ignore that education is more than simply preparation for life, but also an experience lived directly. Contemporary debates have raised a different issue by demonstrating that many uses of tracking also lead to serious inequities. On this point, however, Noddings cautions that we should not confuse equity with sameness. ‘Human talents are wonderfully broad’, she writes, ‘and, if we are really concerned with equity, those talents should be treated with equal respect.’

In calling for an education responsive to students, Noddings places renewed emphasis on the continuities between learning and experience. This too is a recurrent theme in her scholarship. It is also the focus of *Educating for Intelligent Belief or Unbelief*, a book in which Noddings examines the connections between subject areas and the spiritual questions that adolescents often raise about themselves, life, death, nature and religion. In mathematics, for instance, Noddings notes that many great mathematicians have struggled with similar existential questions, including whether God exists, how the universe began, where life came from, and what happens after death. Because such questions seem to transcend time, place and otherwise diverse human experiences, Noddings wonders why they are almost entirely absent in the curriculum, or when present, restricted solely to courses in religion and history.

To counteract this tendency, Noddings provides a wealth of examples that illustrate how educating for intelligent belief or unbelief can be used as the backbone of a school curriculum, not just with respect to spiritual questions but as an approach to open inquiry brought to bear on a broad range of student concerns. In a sense, her proposal represents the contributions of philosophy to education across the curriculum. But for
Noddings, the aims of such inquiry are neither critical thinking per se, nor the type of Socratic argumentation that seeks to defeat an antagonist. Rather, she argues for forms of inquiry that will provide all participants the opportunity to take part in an eternal dialogue. 'In such a dialogue', Noddings writes, 'believer and unbeliever draw closer to one another.'

In summary, while Noddings is best known for her work on ethical caring, her contributions to education span a range of contemporary theories and topics. Foremost among these contributions is Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984. Noddings teaches that caring is a moral attitude informed by the complex skills of interpersonal reasoning, that it is neither without its own forms of rigor nor somehow less professional than the calculated skills of formal logic. Most importantly, Noddings' work demonstrates that caring need not be what Wittgenstein advised we 'must pass over in silence'. On the contrary, to do so would be to miss one of the most pervasive and intriguing forms of human rationality.

Notes
5 Noddings, 'Shaping an Acceptable Child', op cit.
7 Noddings, Caring, op cit.
8 Ibid., p.1.
10 Noddings, Caring, op cit., p.3.
11 Noddings, Women and Evil, op cit.
12 Noddings, The Challenge to Care, op cit.
15 Noddings, 'Accident, Awareness, and Actualization', op cit., p.177.
17 Ibid., p.144.

See also
In Fifty Major Thinkers on Education: Dewey
Dear Nel

Opening the Circles of Care

(Letters to Nel Noddings)

EDITED BY
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Foreword by David Berliner

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Foreword:
A Thank You Card to Nel

I spent a good deal of my professional life studying classroom teaching. Observing in classrooms helped me to develop an understanding of the complexity of the cognitive and emotional work done by teachers. Observation and analyses are the basis of the enormous respect I have for teachers and their practice. So it is not hard to understand the respect I have for Nel. Her background as a classroom teacher infuses her philosophical writing. Her roots show, so to speak, and this makes her special in the world of educational philosophy. Unlike some of her colleagues, she seems to regularly have classrooms and teachers in mind as she thinks about the educational issues that are of interest to her.

Like other educators, I had read her most influential philosophical work on caring relationships, and I admired the sharp analytic skills she brought to understanding the difference between phony and genuine regard for another. More administrators and teachers need to read Nel’s work on caring because more of the relationships between administrators and teachers, and between teachers and their students, seem, on reflection, to be uncaring. In this age of widespread criticism of the public schools, disdain for the teachers who staff them, and amnesia about the nature of youth, genuine caring between all the parties involved in our schools seems to be in quite short supply.

I was always fascinated by Nel’s argument that caring relationships must have within them the enhancement of the other person’s competence. Sympathy, empathy, caring, and the many other synonyms for the expression of these ordinarily positive feelings are considered to be inadequate if the other, the object of the feelings, is not enhanced by the display of those feelings. As I interpret Nel, the cared-for need to be helped by the caring, or it is not a genuine caring relationship. The implication of her analysis is important in these peculiar times: Politicians and administrators who espouse their caring for education, without regard for how educators and children are enhanced by their caring, may well be ruining our public schools! I almost want to shout, “Stop caring! Enough! You are caring us over a cliff!”
But for me, Nel’s important work on caring has not been the most influential of her writings. I found much to think about in her book *Educating for Intelligent Belief or Unbelief*. In the United States we see repeated and escalating conflict between secularists and religious fundamentalists over educational issues. She speaks to this conflict with an authoritative educational voice, one with which John Dewey would surely be sympathetic. Our job as educators, she says, is not to pick sides in the believer/nonbeliever dispute, but to ensure that students have the ability to articulate a basis for their beliefs that is reasonable to themselves, if not to others. Nel has wondered how anything as important as the religious beliefs of a person can be held without examination. How do you make a claim for being a rational person without having examined the basis of either your faith or your apostasy? How can you be a person of faith without ever having challenged and solved for yourself the reasons for your belief in gods, spirits, or nature; in heaven or hell; in eternity or nothingness; in male-only spiritual guides or in the acceptance of female spiritual leaders? How can you defend your agnosticism, atheism, or alternative religious beliefs without having thought deeply and at length about what is essence and what is not in your system of beliefs? These are fundamental educational issues.

The holding of good thoughts, the ability to engage in rational argument, and the articulation of persuasive beliefs are all educational concerns. If not a part of religious training, as too often is the case, such characteristics ought to be a part of the examination of religiosity in our schools. That may be difficult to do, of course, but that is less persuasive an argument to me than is the argument that all our youth ought to have a chance, somewhere, to develop an intelligent system of belief or nonbelief. It is sad that most public schools resist such curricula, afraid to explore this most human of characteristics in a rational way, and in a way that could aid our nation in developing a more tolerant pluralistic society.

Another of the works to which I resonated is her recent book *When School Reform Goes Wrong*. We agree completely on these issues, and I am so glad to have her as an ally. She talks quite simply and persuasively about out-of-school factors that affect schooling, as do I. She and I both understand that you cannot test your way out of the achievement gaps we see between children in different social classes. The cultural and material circumstances of some children are highly compatible with schooling, while that is definitely not true for other children. Assuming that teachers and school systems can produce the same outcomes for children in such different circumstances may be a “nice” belief to hold, but it is illogical and harmful if it becomes a national policy. And that is what has happened. A belief in fairy tales, namely, that everyone will end up equal, became our national policy under the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). Nel rightly skewers those who hold such silly notions. It seems likely that fairy tales such as seen in NCLB provide a way to avoid confronting many of the economic and social inequities that exist in our society. Nel and I both believe that a reduction in those inequalities would do more to narrow the achievement gap than would the blame-and-shame techniques that make up so much of NCLB. As I write this note to Nel, there is no sign that the Barack Obama administration has read, let alone taken to heart, Nel’s highly accessible, straightforward, and eloquent arguments about the failure of NCLB as a reform strategy. That is sad.

In that book and elsewhere, Nel also reminds readers of the narrowing of the curriculum and of thought that inevitably accompanies both high-stakes testing and beliefs in a single set of standards for all students to master. She recognizes, as do psychologists, teachers, and parents, what our politicians and the business community seem not to remember: kids differ enormously in their interests and talents. Why on earth, she asks, would you want everyone to learn calculus or mathematical proofs? Should every student in the United States read *The Red Badge of Courage* or should students read a few different books *of their own choosing* from a broad list of 19th-century American novels? National standards, she notes, could narrow our pool of national talent.

Overly prescriptive standards, I hear her saying, inform us about what an educated or competent person must know and be able to do. But doing that in the ways currently proposed means that we will exclude youth with many of the talents and skills needed to make the society hum. The desire for sameness in educational outcomes, she argues, is a sure way to push many children out of school, as is now well-documented under NCLB, a failed program of accountability not yet abandoned by the Obama administration. The 2009 National Assessment of Educational Progress scores in reading and mathematics show unambiguously that gains made in the 6 years after NCLB, 2003–2006, are less than the gains made before NCLB went into effect. This is true even after the nation has added over 2 hours a week to the reading curriculum and an hour and a half more to the math curriculum, school time stolen from other subjects such as social studies, art, music, science, recess, and lunch. But more time spent learning reading and mathematics has reduced the rates of gain in both areas, a remarkable testimony about what happens when you force all the children into trying to achieve the same ends and the same levels of achievement.

I thought I detected in this book something missing in Nel’s other works: anger! I was glad to see it because it is justified. She knows that the United States can do better. Designing our school system so all children will gain the same outcomes and the same level of achievement is neither a sensible nor a realistic goal for our schools. Caring for students by nurturing their individual talents is a much more sensible and realistic goal. Helping our
students to recognize excellence in whatever areas of interest they develop, as well as cultivating in students the desire to take their place as responsible adults in our democracy, are far more important goals for our educational system than getting another few items right on a mostly multiple-choice test.

Thanks, Nel. You have made many of us think a little more deeply about educational issues and you have moved some in our nation a little closer to designing a better system of education for our children.

—David Berliner

Acknowledgments

First of all, I want to thank the 53 people who contributed to this book. I am keenly aware that you had to take time away from other projects, deadlines, family responsibilities, and so many other commitments to write for this project. Many of you have known Nel for many years, and some have only recently met her or read her work, yet all of you have helped render a composite portrait of her life and scholarship that complements not only her writing, but your own scholarship and teaching as well.

I also want to thank Carole Saltz and everyone in every department at Teacher’s College Press for your extraordinary vision of publishing that cherishes the things that really matter in education in ways that make a project like this possible. So much of what Nel Noddings writes about is expressed on a daily basis in the culture of Teachers College Press, and it has been wonderful to witness “care” at work in all my encounters with you and your staff for this project.

I also want to thank Maxine Greene for the lovely foreword and for being my muse in many more ways than even you could imagine. I also owe an immense thank you to Lynda Stone, who spent time and money to travel from her home to New Jersey to interview Nel for the Epilogue. I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge and thank four of our graduate assistants, Lacy Prine, Amber Bryan, Quinell Vasser, and Olivia Howard, for their outstanding help with proofreading and with arranging the book chapters.

Finally, I want to thank Nel Noddings for allowing me to put this book together and for being the kind of mother, teacher, scholar, and friend that inspires all of us to be fully human, critical, and caring in these times of rampant cynicism and depersonalization.
Circles of Scholarship

Nel's academic work is well within the definition of what Emily Style says about the need for scholars to attend to "the scholarship of them-selves" to make textbooks of their lives, as well as scholarship on the shelves (cited in Wolf, 2001, p. 1). Women philosophers have led a needed revolt against decontextualized "ivory tower" approaches to educational thought and Nel Noddings has played a major role in this endeavor through a life as a situated philosopher. As the letters in this chapter clearly confirm, Nel's circles of scholarship begin with self-reflection and then work outward to encircle families, communities, and nations.

A Tribute to an Idea
Eva Feder Kittay

Dear Nel,

One fine afternoon in Barcelona, as I was trying to catch up on some needed rest before the start of a workshop on care, I reencountered an idea that you first introduced in your landmark contribution Caring.

Despite the jetlag, my mind was racing with thoughts stimulated by a discussion over lunch with a few workshop participants. With laptop in tow, I sought out a local café and in a matter of an afternoon I had a new paper: "The Completion of Care." If the phrase sounds familiar, it is because it is your phrase. Over lunch we had debated the positive impact of care on the caregiver. In my writings I have often stressed the toll on the caregiver because I have wanted to avoid sentimentalizing what is often hard work and is underpaid or unpaid. But this emphasis on the burden of care creates its own distortion. We see dependency as merely negative, and the work of caring for dependents as "necessary work" (in the Marxian sense) best foisted on those who have little chance of doing more "fulfilling" work. You'll remember Simone de Beauvoir's devastating discussion of the tedium of work that can never be the occasion for transcendence. As feminists we need to reject this vision as well.
Nel, you know I am one philosopher who doesn’t shy away from admitting the extent to which the concerns of my personal life stimulate much of my philosophizing. (I think we all do this, but for some, like myself, the spur is closer to the mind’s surface.) I mention this, because while the care of my daughter Sesha, who with her profound dependency has initiated much of my thinking about care, I recently have also been dealing with the care of my 91-year-old mother. My mother, unlike my daughter, resists my care. She battles fiercely to maintain her independence, as she understands it. Rather than feel relief and gratitude that she is not “burdening” me, I feel sad, even angry, that she will not accept my care. (Apparently both the parent’s resistance and the adult child’s dismay are quite common.)

The lunchtime conversation helped me see that it was because I viewed caregiving as something that would enhance my well-being as well as hers that I was pained by this thwarted desire. And that’s when it came to me—I recalled your words “Care must be completed in the other if it is to be a relation.” My anger arose because my mother refused to complete my care, refused a certain sort of relation I wanted to have with her. (I also recalled that Joan Tronto speaks of the fourth or last phase of care as care that is recognized or received as care.)

Being in Barcelona, away from my books or a library, I wasn’t then able to review what you said about this aspect of care. Yet the primary reason I needed to refresh my knowledge of this aspect of your work was because on first reading Caring I rejected the notion entirely. I think I was not alone, for with the exception of Tronto, who speaks of the reception of care as the final phase of care, I cannot recall anyone else who takes up the idea. (And I believe that Tronto never develops the notion.) Until I could get back to my dog-eared copy, I would have to muddle through myself.

Why did I pay so little attention to this idea before? My thinking about dependency and care had its starting point in the care of my daughter Sesha. She, as you know, is totally dependent. This beautiful, sweet, delightful woman (she is now 40!) is unable to do anything for herself because of her serious cognitive impairments, her cerebral palsy, and her seizure disorder. I thought that to begin theorizing from the most extreme case would reveal features of care that more ordinary ones concealed. When we care for another, we may think, “I care for so and so, and (implicitly) I expect that she will do the same when I need care,” or, “As I make sacrifices for another, I expect her gratitude.” I did not expect Sesha to reciprocate, nor did I expect expressions of gratitude. Her presence and well-being was all I sought. I expected nothing from her. Thus, the idea that she needed to “complete my care” made little sense to me. If caring required some participation on my daughter’s side, it wasn’t clear that one could really say that one cared for her—and this was nonsense. So I outright rejected any idea that anything was required of the caring for.

Now that I also need to care for my mother, I finally get it. The contrasting experience makes me realize that Sesha has always completed my care, but has done so with a graciousness that has made it invisible. Had she shrieked and fought, and only at times cooperated, I would have understood this earlier. Because she is so lovely and loving, so cooperative, so responsive in her own quiet way, I was fooled into thinking that she was not an active participant in the care. (I think it is not unreasonable to consider this gracious taking up of care a moral virtue on her part. It is surely something that draws her caregivers close to her and something that they deeply appreciate about her.)

The more I thought about the completion of care, the richer the idea became. Just start with a simple thought experiment. I have a houseplant that needs watering. I see some clear liquid in a glass. Thinking it’s water, I pour it into the pot. Unbeknownst to me, it was vinegar. Had I cared for the plant? Most would (and do) answer no. Thus, even from our ordinary understanding of care we can say, Nothing can count as caring if it is ineffectual or produces an ill effect for the being that is cared for.

Gilbert Ryle in his The Concept of Mind (2002) speaks of “achievement verbs” that are applicable only once the action is done. One only wins a race when it is won, not when it is run. The thought experiment shows that care is an achievement verb, which in turn means care is an act and must hit the mark if it is to be care. If this means that caring requires the cared for to “take up the action as care,” then caring is also always relational. When I returned to your text, I found that many of my “discoveries” were already in Caring. You had already stressed that care requires action, not merely intention. In the expanded version of the paper, I make use of this point to reason that a care ethics can be neither a deontological nor a virtue ethics. Despite the resistance to the thought that an act can be morally worthy only when someone else responds, in Caring, you bite this bullet. I would add to your own excellent discussion a point that makes the stringency of this requirement more palatable. We can still say that a person who fails to care only because her caring is not taken up by the other is praiseworthy in altruism, heroism, or good-heartedness. But she cannot be morally praised as a carer.

I then lean on Bernard Williams’s (1981) incisive discussion of moral luck to argue that an ethic of care is especially (though not exclusively) prone to the machinations of luck—luck respecting who we chose (or are assigned) to care for, the match of our skills to the task at hand, the possibility of forging a relationship, and so on.

While the emphasis on completion may look like it turns an ethic of care into a consequentialist ethic, that is a mistake. For all care, as you show so well, requires a motivational shift to the concerns and needs of the other. Benefiting the other without this intentional or attitudinal element no more yields care than does the attitude or intention alone. Consequently, from the
consideration of completion of care, we arrive at the position that an ethic of care is sui generis.

Your contribution to the discussion of the completion of care is especially strong when you discuss it in terms of care’s relationality. You say, “My caring has somehow to be completed in the other if the relation is to be described as caring” (Noddings, 1984, p.4). And you provide a wonderful phenomenological account of what a caring relationship looks like. I add a few points that may be of interest to you.

One is that if care needs to be completed in the other, then if there is no prior relationship, a relation must emerge or care will not happen. We must not, however, understand the emergent relationship as caregiving’s intrinsic reward. The taking up of care is like the stage actor’s having an audience that can witness and applaud the performance. It is the condition of the possibility of stage acting. But the actor (and carer) still needs to get paid.

The applause analogy is limited, however, because applause comes at the end of the act. When caring is sustained, a deeper relationship can develop through the ongoing interaction of the carer and cared for. If one approach fails, the skillful caregiver shifts. A caregiver who normally moves quickly and efficiently may have to slow down to listen. The confident one may find herself needing to be more humble. (And now we return to the concerns I raised at the start of the letter.) In this dance where the caregiver leads and the cared-for takes the cue, caregiving can become a source of self-shaping. The carer comes to discover internal resources and new vulnerabilities. The carer may uncover a need more pressing than the originating one, but also more strengths. Carer and cared for form a catalytic relationship in which neither’s flourishing occurs in the absence of the other’s flourishing. We have here a dialectical relationality that can sustain us through the long haul.

I end with a note of thanks and a tribute to an idea: the completion of care. It can be added to the many you have contributed, all of which have spurred the rapid development of an ethic whose insights transform our philosophy and our ethical life.

Warm regards,
Eva Feder Kittay

Caring and Moral Philosophy

Lawrence Blum

Dear Nel,

When I reflect on what your work has meant to me over the years, I inevitably come back to my encounter with Caring. My copy is of the original hardback. I no longer buy hardbacks because of the shrinking book space in my house and office. But the cover of that book, with the father looking tenderly at his infant pressed to his chest, and his wife or partner embracing both him and the child, is not something I was used to seeing in a philosophy book. It expresses the complex gender politics of your book but in some way counters your use of feminine in the book’s subtitle: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. I know you have gotten a lot of grief for that subtitle over the years, that you had not at the time known of the feminist tradition in philosophy in which you would soon become one of the major figures, and that you are still somewhat ambivalent about whether that word might not express something important that you would not want the reader to lose sight of. I took the cover to emphasize that the ethic of care belonged as much to men as to women, and that even the tie between parent and young children, which is so often (and not wrongly) taken as fundamental to the female version of caring can be manifested in men if they would embrace it.

But the cover of your book was important for another reason that I am not entirely happy to admit, but perhaps this collection is a place in which I should do so. I’ll have to place that reaction in context. I was at the time a moral philosopher, strongly trained in the Anglo-American tradition of the 1960s and 1970s. Utilitarianism and Kantianism were the reigning schools of thought. There was no defined alternative to them at the time. But I was never satisfied with these alternatives. A rare exception was stated by Bernard Williams when he pointed to some problems both views shared and had briefly suggested the importance of moral emotions in his 1965 paper. But hardly anyone was articulating an emotion-based alternative to the dominant rationalist schools of thought.

I had been fortunate to encounter Simone Weil’s work in the late 1960s, when I was studying with Peter Winch. And I was especially enthralled with Iris Murdoch’s 1970 collection of essays, The Sovereignty of Good, in which Weil’s notion of “attention” was put to a creative ethical use. But no one was writing about either Weil or Murdoch, in the tradition with which I identified, and I did not really know how to do so myself. I couldn’t figure out how to make the connections. You know, and knew at the time, that in 1980 I wrote a book on altruism; friendship; and altruistic emotions such as empathy, sympathy, and compassion, and I was pleased that you referred to it briefly in your book. But my work was still very tied to the Kantian paradigm as I was fighting my way out of it and against it.

I was familiar with the idea of “care,” as I knew Carol Gilligan in the early 1980s and was in a philosophy/psychology study group with her. Nevertheless, your book was an absolute revelation. You developed the idea of caring so much further than Gilligan aspired to do. (As a moral psychologist, she had a different project.) Your book blew my mind, as we used to say in those days.
Dear Nel: Opening the Circles of Care (Letters to Nel Noddings)

But, and here is the sort of embarrassing part, it felt like it was coming out of left field in relation to what I recognized as philosophical ethics. You just didn't have the same intellectual reference points. You talked about Buber! I just couldn't figure out where to place you in relation to what I knew.

But this is a minor point. I soon recognized the absolute originality of your book. I loved it. I have used it as a major text in every ethical theory course I have taught since then. You really helped me ultimately to find a way to bridge the divide between my "analytic" ethics background and the dissatisfactions I had with that tradition, and the Weil-Murdoch-Williams I had been drawn to.

I think the insights of Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education still have not been adequately taken up by mainstream moral philosophy. Feminist moral philosophy has certainly done a better job, and I was happy when your work started being discussed in Hypatia and elsewhere. But I still feel that there is more there that moral philosophy needs to learn from.

For me, a perfect example of this is the importance of caring relationships. As you have said in other subsequent writings, you are suspicious of turning caring into an individual virtue, and one main reason for this is that it omits the importance of caring relationships. I think that is absolutely right. Of course there has been much more philosophical attention to personal relationships since (and partly because of) Caring, and that is all to the good. Moral philosophers have not looked enough at the character of the good to the cared-for of being cared for. Normally someone who is cared for desires and appreciates the other's care, and above and above the acts of help that this care leads to from the one-caring. I think this focus on ethics narrowly construed limits Michael Slote's important 2007 contribution to care ethics by leading him to neglect caring relationships (though he recognizes their importance).

My reading of Caring is that you were struggling to express what kind of good the good of a caring relationship is, in relation to the good of caring on the part of the one-caring and the good to the cared-for. Sometimes you say that unless the cared-for reciprocates or recognizes the caring, the one-caring cannot really be said to care. Other times you take the view that even if the one-caring can be spoken of as caring, without recognition, the relationship does not count as a caring relationship. I don't think you fully settle this not-merely-terminological dispute. But for me the larger substantive issue is that caring relationships embody a distinctive kind of goodness, and that goodness requires acknowledgment and response. You wonderfully describe the phenomenology of both parties to the caring relationship, capturing the rich complexity of this phenomenon. Here is an example of a passage that illustrates that richness for me: "The cared-for is free to be more fully himself in the caring relation. Indeed, this being himself, this willing

and unselfconscious revealing of self, is his major contribution to the relation. This is his tribute to the one-caring, but it is not delivered up as tribute" (Noddings, 1984, p. 73). This kind of insight really helps us to understand the distinctive good of relationships. And I am not seeing the subtlety and richness of this kind of phenomenological insight in the moral philosophy literature with which I am familiar.

Thank you for your enriching the tradition of moral philosophy with which I identify, and also for your acts of professional kindness to me over the years.

—Lawrence Blum

The Toughness of Caring

Nicholas C. Burbules

Dear Nel,

I suppose I’ve reached a point in my life when I'm starting to recognize the many things I’ve learned from others. There aren’t enough opportunities to say all the thank yous, or enough time. But this project provides me at least one opportunity, and a bit of time, to say thanks to you.

I’m sitting here with a copy of Caring alongside me, the first printing, the one with your name misspelled on the cover. I remember that I was lucky enough to be one of the first to read the manuscript, as a midprogram doctoral student, and you were kind enough to credit me in the acknowledgments (although I can’t imagine I had anything of substance to contribute to the project).

I do know that this book was my first exposure to a kind of ethics that turned a lot of my ideas upside down, and which continues to shape my outlook to this day. While I didn't come to adopt an ethics of care, per se, I did come to appreciate the focus on personal character and relations with others that I now understand as part of a broader virtue ethics, the very old Greek notion that is having a renaissance lately. The idea that becoming an ethical person is a matter of self-conduct, and not rule following, was new to me. The idea that this self is always situated in a set of relations through which we learn, practice, and improve our exercise of these virtues makes ethics a central educational problem. The idea that emotion, judgment, and sensitivity to the particulars of a moral situation are key to the enactment of virtue still strikes me as a deep insight, and an invaluable corrective to the ways in which ethics are often discussed, even by many adherents of so-called character education.
All these understandings I trace to the first times I read this book. But it is hard for me to separate my appreciation of the book from the experience of knowing its author (and, really, why in a case like this should it be otherwise?). I can't read this book without hearing your voice saying the words and without thinking about the ways that you have lived what is written in it.

And this introduces the second theme I learned from the book, and from you. It touches upon a certain misreading, I think, of what an ethics of care requires of us. Too often your work is caricatured as a kind of “ethics of niceness.” And perhaps the pink cover, the Feminine Approach to Ethics subtitle, and the legacy of certain residual stereotypes and essentialisms led readers to think that caring refers simply to a certain kind of sentimentalized maternalism.

You are, indeed, a very nice person. But the privilege of knowing you and seeing you in many situations remind me also of your capacity for anger, tough-mindedness, critique, and political outrage. The sentimentalized view would see these as deviations from caring, needing to be redeemed through compensatory tenderness. But that way of thinking reinscribes just the kinds of false dualities between caring and criticism, between tough- and tendermindedness, between stereotypically feminine and masculine values that I see your work as challenging.

Returning to the book, I am reminded of my favorite (and often overlooked) section “The Toughness of Caring.” I like these few pages because they challenge the easy position that caring is just a matter of niceness, that if we just care (and care more and more), that makes us a better person. Perhaps it is the experience of parenting, which I have now but didn’t have when I first read the book, that makes me appreciate your observations that caring for others requires caring for the self. It is a dangerous thing (especially for women) to be told that giving and giving without regard for one’s own needs is the way to be good, that altruism is a limitless moral injunction, that the needs of others are always more important than one’s own. Many teachers, as my colleague Chris Higgins has written, are susceptible to these myths, often resulting in exhaustion and burnout. This goes for parents too.

I also like the passage “Our own ethicality is not entirely ‘up to us’” (Noddings, 1992, p. 102), because it makes the relationality of our moral selves concrete and complicated. It is not in fact possible to always care, or to care for everyone (except in some attenuated and abstract sense). We love our children even when they are not always lovable; but sometimes part of that love is criticism, punishment, and allowing them to suffer the consequences of their bad decisions. We also fail, despite our desires, to be always the caring parents, partners, or friends with others we wish we could be. This is true not only because we are imperfect but because caring is not just one thing, but a complex set of feelings and judgments that entail things besides niceness, perpetual kindness, and giving. Of course sometimes caring (and caring for the self) involves saying no, or “I can’t” or “I don’t want to”—and with these choices always comes the possibility of going awry.

Then we come to that wonderful section on “my own ferocity” (pp. 100–101). This isn’t just the ferocity of the mother lion protecting her cubs, but an acknowledgment of a human capacity that is constitutive of us as animals, which most of us never have occasion to act upon, but which is a part of us, tied to our capacity for anger and hate—which is to say tied to our capacity to care passionately and to act aggressively for what we think is right. Treating these qualities as somehow extramoral or as parts of ourselves we must always resist and keep in check is an oversimplification of our complex moral identity and agency. And that, too, is something I have learned from this book: If caring were a matter of just being nice to everyone, we would actually be disempowered as moral beings. Acknowledging that fact, and following it through to its consequences, yields a more interesting, a more complicated and difficult, ethic than I think many have taken from a cursory or secondhand reading of Caring.

Finally, it is this respect for what is interesting, complicated, and difficult in matters of ethics that I take most from your book, from our many conversations, and from watching the life you have lived. My own philosophical life and understanding are richer because of it. Thank you, Nel.

Nick
Nicholas C. Burbules

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**What Is Ethics . . . After ‘After All’?**

**Ann Diller**

Dear Nel,

As I sit here gazing out at the spring greenness of New Hampshire—apple blossoms opening, lilacs filling dooryards with their fragrance—I reflect on the flowering of your scholarship and find myself recalling a favorite passage from *Caring*: “It sounds all very nice, says my male colleague, but can you claim to be doing ‘ethics’? After all, ethics is the study of justified action. . . . Ah, yes. But, after ‘after all,’ I am a woman, and I was not party to that definition. Shall we say then that I am talking about ‘how to meet the other morally’? Is this part of ethics? Is ethics part of this?” (Noddings, 2003a, p. 95) I read it again and notice how I still feel an unmistakable thrill, a surge of excited energy. Why does this passage leap to mind in such a fresh way today?
I cannot remember a time when I was not already interested in ethics and concerned about moral education. But I can remember numerous times when I struggled over how best to teach ethics and moral education. Then came your book *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*. From my very first reading of *Caring*, I knew you had set forth a significant new "paradigm" with far-reaching consequences. And now, as I sit here reflecting back, I realize how transformative your work on the ethics of care has been in its influence on the way I teach teachers, on the teachers themselves, and on the course of my own scholarship. Your influence on my scholarship can, for the most part, be seen or inferred as a matter of published knowledge. In this letter, I want to tell you about a few highlights regarding your influence on the teachers themselves.

Shortly after the publication of *Caring*, I found myself presenting a synopsis of your book during a university summer session course for experienced teachers. What stands out vividly to this day was the eruption of enthusiasm from these teachers, particularly from the elementary school teachers, most of them women, a few men, all of whom "not party" to the standard definitions of ethics and of moral education. Their obvious delight arose from the recognition that finally someone had articulated what these teachers themselves felt to be their own deep sense of educational purpose. Someone had named, in print, what really mattered to them as teachers of young children. You not only acknowledged but also honored what they felt to be the guiding principles underlying their daily classroom interactions with students.

Thus began a recurrent phenomenon, one I have enjoyed witnessing over and over again: When teachers learn about your account of an ethics of care in education, which so clearly articulates their own felt sense of purpose as "one-caring," their sense of full-fledged membership in an ethical community is revived and strengthened. In recent years, this also includes something akin to membership in an "underground" ethical movement committed to sustaining relational values in a climate where genuine caring gets pushed aside, if not trampled or co-opted, in the press of frenzied "races" to reach the "top."

In addition, I've noticed that we, your readers, caregivers from various walks of life—teachers, other educators, parents, nurses, and so on—appreciate the precision of your scholarship, the phenomenological detailing that uncovers the complex relational labor entailed in caring. And at the same time, in conjunction with your illuminating excavation of the multifaceted nature of caring relations, you give central place to a crucial fact about the ethics of care, namely, that in any single moment a person can immediately gain access to and act upon this ethic. This crucial fact brings me to another point about your influence on teachers.

As you observe in your introduction to the second edition of *The Challenge to Care in Schools*, "People differ on what they mean by caring" (Noddings, 2005c, p. xiv). When I first taught an ethics of care to my preservice teacher education students, those preparing to teach in public high schools kept insisting there was "no way" they could "care for" what they envisioned as the 100 or more students attending their classes; they would "not have enough time!" Thus, I found myself pushing them to deepen their understanding of what constitutes the central focus of this ethic, namely, "how to meet the other morally": "When I care, I really hear, see, or feel what the other tries to convey. The engagement or attention may last only a few moments and it may or may not be repeated in future encounters, but it is full and essential in any caring encounter" (Noddings, 2005c, p. 16).

Even such a brief chance meeting as one where "a stranger stops me to ask directions" can be an occasion for a caring encounter if "I listen attentively to his need, and I respond in a way that he receives and recognizes" (2005c, p. 16). Thus, as they studied and pondered your descriptions, my high school teachers began to realize that if we can pause in our personal trajectories, and temporarily bracket our own agendas, then the actual time required to "care" may take only a few moments, during which we give a student our full complete attention. After all, in the last analysis, it is only in each present moment that we ever can, and do, "meet the other morally." Sometimes this may happen only once between a teacher and a particular student. In other instances, caring moments between teachers and students recur often enough to create and sustain caring relations; indeed, occasionally such relationships last for years, well after students have graduated.

In closing, I want to add a personal note. Although, in one sense, I "knew" from my first reading how your fierce unwavering focus on "meeting the other morally" aligns with your insistence on that transformative move away from the traditional preoccupation with justification, I now understand this more experientially. In another one of my favorite passages, you write, "As one-caring I am not seeking justification for my action; I am not standing alone before some tribunal... I am not justified but somehow fulfilled and completed in my own life and in the lives of those I have thus influenced" (Noddings, 2003a, p. 95). In life, when we are experiencing moments of total engrossment during a caring encounter the question of "justification" simply does not arise. There is no time, no need, and no inclination, for adding on extraneous layers of preoccupation with "justified action." Our attention moves fully into meeting each other as one-caring and we do find ourselves "fulfilled and completed"... "after, after all."

—Ann Diller
June, 2015

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EDUCATION
B.A. Mathematics and Physical Science
Montclair State College, New Jersey

M.A. Mathematics
1964 Rutgers University, New Jersey

Ph.D. Education (Educational Philosophy and Theory)
1973 Stanford University, California
1974 Standard Administration Credential
Stanford University, California

EXPERIENCE
2003- Lee Jacks Professor of Education Emerita, Stanford University.

2002- Lee Jacks Professor of Education Emerita, Stanford; also John W. Porter Chair in Urban Education, Eastern Michigan University.

Lee Jacks Professor Emerita, Stanford; also A. Lindsay O’Connor Professor of American Institutions, Colgate University (Fall, 2001); Libra Professor, University of Southern Maine (Spring).

1998-2003 Lee L. Jacks Professor of Child Education, Emerita, Stanford University and Professor of Philosophy and Education, Teachers College Columbia

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1994- Lee L. Jacks Professor of Education, Stanford University

Fall 1994 Visiting Professor, Teachers College, Columbia University

1992-1994 Lee L. Jacks Professor of Child Education and Acting Dean, School of Education, Stanford University

1990-1992 Professor and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, School of Education, Stanford University

1986- Professor of Education, Stanford University

1983-1986 Associate Professor and Director of Teacher Education (STEP), Stanford University

1979-1983 Assistant Professor of Education, Stanford University

1977-1979 Acting Assistant Professor of Education, Stanford University. Taught courses in curriculum and instruction.
1976 Private educational consulting. Clients included NIE (Curriculum Development Task Force); Policy Studies in Education, NY (workshops for elementary principals on instructional leadership); Sequoia Union H.S. District (instructional leadership problems); Computer Curriculum Corporation (math curriculum writing).

1975-1976 Director of Pre-Collegiate Education, The University of Chicago.

Fall 1973 Assistant Professor of Education, Pennsylvania State University. Taught courses in philosophy of education.


1964-1969 Teacher, Department Chairperson, Assistant Principal, Matawan Regional High School, New Jersey.

Instructor, co-adjutant staff, Rutgers. Taught courses in modern math for high, junior high, and elementary school teachers (4 years); also taught in-service courses for elementary teachers in several communities.

1962-1964 At Rutgers University, NSF Fellowship (Mathematics)

1958-1962 Mathematics Department Chairperson, Matawan.

1949-1952 Teacher, grades 6-9, Woodbury, New Jersey. Taught all subjects; supervised school paper, student council, drama, social functions; participated in experimental program with self-contained seventh and eighth grades.

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

Philosophy of Education Society
American Educational Research Association (AERA)
Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP--APA)
American Philosophical Association (APA)
North American Society for Social Philosophy
John Dewey Society
National Academy of Education
Kappa Delta Pi (Laureate Chapter)

LICENSES

New Jersey Secondary School Teaching Credential, Mathematics and Physical Science, 5-12.
New Jersey Supervisor's Certificate (Reg. Life).
California Standard Teaching Credential, Secondary School Mathematics, Life.
California Standard Administration Credential (Authorizations a,b,c,d,e,f), Life.

HONORS

Excellence in Teaching Award, Stanford University School of Education, 1981.
Excellence in Teaching Award, Stanford University School of Education, 1982.

Listed in Contemporary Authors
Foremost Women of Twentieth Century
Who's Who of American Women
International Women's Who's Who
Who's Who in the Humanities
Who's Who in American Education
Who's Who in America
Wikipedia
Member of Visiting Board for the Center for Human Caring, School of Nursing, University of Colorado, 1988-92.
Phi Beta Kappa Visiting Scholar, 1989-90.
Sabbatical writing grant, 1989-90, the Lilly Endowment.
Distinguished Women's Advisory Board, College of St. Catherine's, 1990-92.
Anne Roe Award for Contributions to the Professional Development of Women, Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1993.
Kappa Delta Pi Laureate Chapter, elected 1994.
Spencer Mentor Award, 1995-97.
Wilystine Goodsell Award (AERA), 1997.
Pi Lambda Theta Excellence in Education Award, 1999.
Alumni Citation Award, Montclair State University
Lifetime Achievement Award (AERA, Div. B, Curriculum), 2000
Distinguished Educator Award, Association of Teacher Educators, 2000
Outstanding Educator Award, Kappa Chapter, Kappa Delta Pi, 2001
President, National Academy of Education, 2001-2005
Biography in 50 Modern Thinkers on Education.
Award for Distinguished Leadership in Education, Rutgers University, May, 2004.
Honorary Doctor of Letters, Montclair State University, 2006.
Honorary Degree of Doctor of Laws, Queen’s University (Canada), June1, 2006.
Inaugural Member, AERA Fellows, 2009.
Honorary Doctor of Pedagogy, Manhattan College, 2010.
Lifetime Achievement Award, John Dewey Society, 2011
Honorary Professor, Beijing Normal University, China
Honorary Doctorate offered (not conferred due to travel problems) Haifa University, 2012.

DISSENTATION
Constructivism as a Base for a Theory of Teaching, Stanford University, California, 1973.

PUBLICATIONS

Books and Monographs


Computerized Curricula


Chapters


1994  


1995  


1996  


1997  


1998  


"When should we Transgress?" in *Philosophy of Education 2000*.

"Jane Addams," in *100 Great Thinkers on Education*, ed. Joy Palmer and David Cooper.


2004


2005


“Place-Based Education to Preserve the Earth and its People,” in *Educating Citizens for Global Awareness*, ed. Nel Noddings.

“What Have We Learned?” in *Educating Citizens for Global Citizens Awareness*, ed. Noddings.

“Caring and Social Policy, in *Socializing Care*, ed. Maurice Hamington and Dorothy Miller.

“Beyond Belief,” *Philosophy of Education*.

2006


“Care,” in the *Handbook of Contemporary Education*, ed. Jurgen Oelkers and Dietrich Benner


2008


2009-2010


“Hope for the Future,” in Moral Ground: Ethical Action for a Planet in Planet, ed. Kathleen Dean Moore and Michael Paul Nelson. Also published on line.


“Care Ethics, Caregiving, and Global Caring,” in Yearbook for Women and Gender Studies in Education, ed. Inga Pinhard and Vera Moser. (Germany)


2011


2012


2013


2015


2016

Articles
      "Response to Oscanyan: An Alternative View of `Teaching My Students to Learn on Their Own,'" *Educational Theory*, 28, 142-46.
1983  "Why is Piaget So Hard to Apply in the Classroom," *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 5:2, 84-103.


1987 "Do We Really Want to Produce Moral People?" *Journal of Moral Education*, 16:3, 177-88.


"Politicizing the Mathematics Classroom," *Zentralblatt für Didaktik der Mathematik* (ZDM), 87/6, 221-224.


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"Do We Really Want to Educate Good People?" Donovan Lecture. Boston: Boston College.


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"God and Humanism in the Public Schools," Free Inquiry, Summer.

"Excellence: A Rejoinder," Teachers College Record, 96(1).

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"Teaching Themes of Care," Phi Delta Kappan, May.

1996 "On Community," Educational Theory, Summer

"Rethinking the College-Bound Curriculum," Phi Delta Kappan, December.


"Care and Equity," Royal Bank Lecture, MSTE News, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario.


"Thinking about Standards," Phi Delta Kappan, November.


“The Deepening Dilemma of Civic Education in a Liberal Society,” Social Science Record, Spring.

“Perspectives from Feminist Philosophy,” ER, June-July.
“Teachers and Subject Matter Knowledge,” Teacher Education Quarterly, Fall.
“Longing for the Sacred in Schools,” Educational Leadership, December.
2000 “Algebra for All?” Dialogues, Journal of NCTM.
“How we Teach Matters,” Journal of Supervision and Curriculum.
“Care and Coercion,” Journal of Educational Change.
“Hutchins and Dewey: Two Views of Democracy,” Zeitschrift fur Padagogische Historiographie
“Is Teaching a Practice?” Journal of Philosophy of Education (Great Britain).
“War, Critical Thinking, and Self-Understanding,” Phi Delta Kappan.
“Learning from our Students,” Kappa Delta Pi Record
“Rethinking a Bad Law,” Education Week, Feb. 24.
“More than Rules and Slogans,” Education Next, May.
“Helping Students to Think,” Journal of Educational Controversy, an electronic journal.
“Caring in Education,” The Encyclopedia of Informal Education, infed.org
“Learning, Caring and Happiness,” [Japanese Proceedings].
“Aims, Goals, and Objectives,” Encounters on Education.

“Moral Education in an Age of Globalization,” *Educational Philosophy and Theory.*

“Schooling for Democracy,” *Phi Delta Kappan.*


2009 “Responsibility,” *LEARNING Landscapes.*


“What can Teachers Learn from Research?” *Kappa Delta Pi Record.*


2010 “Differentiate, Don’t Standardize,” *Quality Counts.* (Education Week)

“Moral Education and Caring,” *Theory and Research in Education.*

“Moral Education in an Age of Globalization,” *Educational Philosophy and Theory.*

“Teacher Tess in Testing Land,” *Education Week.*

“Complexity in Caring and Empathy,” *Abstracta.*

2011 “Schooling for Democracy,” *Democracy and Education.*

“The Language of Care Ethics,” *Knowledge Quest.*


“Cosmopolitanism, Patriotism, and Ecology,” *Encounters.*


2013 “Renewing the Spirit of the Liberal Arts,” *Journal of General Education,* Fall.

“Standardized Curriculum and the Loss of Creativity, *Theory into Practice.* “Can We Teach Parenting in our Schools?” TRE.


“Thoughts on NAEd Ten Years Later,” NAEd Anniversary Volume.

“Critical thinking,” *Journal of Educational Controversy.*

PROFESSIONAL OFFICES, SPECIAL TASKS

President, Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, 1979.

Executive Board, Philosophy of Education Society, 1981-83.

President of California Association for Philosophy of Education, 1985.


EDITORIAL AND ADVISORY BOARDS, REVIEWING


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Curriculum policy-making for an emerging profession: The structure, process, and outcome of creating a graduate institute for translation and interpretation studies in the Republic of China of Taiwan
An Ethic of Caring
and Its Implications
for Instructional Arrangements

NEL NODDINGS
Stanford University

Education for moral life has, until recently, been a primary aim of American schooling. In this essay, it is argued that the aim itself is appropriate but that our conception of morality needs revision. Caring is suggested both as a moral orientation to teaching and as an aim of moral education. After a brief discussion of ethics of caring, four components of a model for moral education are described: modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation. Use of this model requires that teachers and students spend more time together so that relations of trust may be established. Finally, the perspective of caring is used to make recommendations on research for teaching.

Until recent years, most Americans seem to have assumed that a fundamental aim of schooling should be the production of a moral citizenry. It could be argued that, although this assumption is sound and still widely held, the hypocrisy inherent in a blend of Christian doctrine and individualist ideology has created opposition to traditional forms of moral education. What is needed, then, is not a new assumption but a more appropriate conception of morality. An ethic of caring arising out of both ancient notions of agapism and contemporary feminism will be suggested as an alternative approach. After describing caring as a moral perspective, I will discuss the vast changes that such an orientation implies in schooling, and one of these will be explored in some depth. In conclusion, I will suggest ways in which educational research might contribute to this important project.

Morality as an Educational Aim

Morality has been a long-standing interest in schools. Indeed, the detachment of schools from explicitly moral aims is a product of the last few decades. It would have been unthinkable early in this century—even in programs guided by highly technical lists of specific objectives—to ask such a question as, Must we educate? We sometimes forget that even Franklin Bobbitt and others who were advocates of the technological or factory model of progressivism were nonetheless interested in the development of moral persons, good citizens, adequate parents, and serene spirits. Bobbitt himself said: "The social point of view herein expressed is sometimes characterized as being utilitarian. It may be so; but not in any narrow or undesirable sense. It demands that training be as wide as life itself. It looks to human activities of every type: religious activities; civic activities; the duties of one's calling; one's family duties; one's recreations; one's reading and meditation; and the rest of the things that are done by the complete man or woman" (Bobbitt 1915, p. 20).

Yet, today it seems innovative—even intrusive—to suggest that schools should consciously aim at educating people for moral life and that perhaps the best way to accomplish this aim is to conduct the process in a thoroughly moral way. People who should know better continually claim that schools can do only one thing well—the direct teaching of basic skills. In a recent letter that apparently reflects the position espoused in their book (Gann and Duignan 1986), L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan say, "Above all, we should avoid the temptation to regard the school as an instrument that can cure all social ills. The school's job is to teach basic academic skills" (Gann and Duignan 1987). This statement captures a tiny corner of truth, but it ignores the citadel to which this corner belongs.

An honest appraisal of American traditions of schooling reveals that academic skills have long been thought of as a vehicle for the development of character. This was true in colonial days, it was true throughout the nineteenth century, and it was still true in the first half of the twentieth century. Schools have always been considered as incubators for acceptable citizens, and citizenship has not always been defined in terms of academic achievement scores. The morality stressed by nineteenth- and early twentieth-century schools contained a measure of hypocrisy, to be sure. Drawing on both Christian doctrine and an ideology of individualism, recommendations on moral education emphasized both self-sacrifice and success through determination, ambition,
and competition. The influential Character Development League, for example, stated in the opening paragraph of its Character Lessons: "Character in its primary principle and groundwork is self-control and self-giving, and the only practical method of enforcing this upon the habit of children is to keep before them examples of self-control and self-sacrifice" (Carr 1909). Character Lessons, however, is liberally laced with success stories, and, indeed, teachers are urged to credit each child for her or his contributions to a "Golden Deed Book." In the closing paragraphs of his Introduction, Carr suggests, "A small prize for the grade having the best 'Golden Deed Book' and another to the pupil of the grade having the most Deeds to its credit, will arouse a discriminating interest. . . ." (Carr 1909). Thus, educators were urged to encourage both Christian charity and American entrepreneurship.

In describing a mid-nineteenth-century school's operations, David Tyack and Elizabeth Hansot comment: "These mid-century themes suggest how deeply the absolutist morality of the evangelical movement became interwoven with a work ethic and ideology favoring the development of capitalism. Just as Christianity was inseparable from Americanism, so the entrepreneurial economic values seemed so self-evidently correct as to be taken for granted. The school gave everyone a chance to become hard-working, literate, temperate, frugal, a good planner" (italics added; Tyack and Hansot 1982, p. 28).

The school was not expected to cure social ills; in this Gann and Duignan are correct. Rather, it was expected to teach vigorously the values of a society that thought it was righteous. The spirit was evangelical at every level from home and school to national and international politics where speakers, writers, and statesmen regularly took the position that the United States had a God-given mission to export its righteous way of life to the rest of the world. However wrong we may now consider this arrogant posture, it is clear that hardly anyone thought that the school's major or only job was to teach academic skills. This we did in the service of moral ends, not as an end in itself.

I am certainly not recommending a return to the self-righteous moralizing of the nineteenth century. On the contrary, I would argue for a strong rejection of this attitude, accompanied by a thorough study of its history and ideology. We cannot overcome a perspective, a worldview, as powerful as this one by ignoring it; we have to explore it both appreciatively and critically. Indeed, I would go so far as to suggest that proponents of "basic skills only" may really want to maintain the earlier attitude of Christian-American supremacy and that avoidance of moral issues and social ills is the only currently feasible way to accomplish this. The apparent consensus of earlier times has been lost. Further, attempts to restore the values of a diminishing majority

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have not been successful. Too many feisty minorities have found their voices and are beginning to suggest alternatives among moral priorities. In such a climate, the only way left for the weakening group in power is to block discussion entirely and hope that hegemonic structures will press things down into the old containers. The need for moral education is apparent to everyone, but concerns about the form it should take induce paralysis. Thus, I suggest that our forbears were right in establishing the education of a moral people as the primary aim of schooling, but they were often shortsighted and arrogant in their description of what it means to be moral.

Caring as a Moral Orientation in Teaching

Although schools and other institutions have in general withdrawn from the task of moral education (some exceptions will be noted), there is a philosophical revival of interest in practical ethics. Several authors have commented on the arrogance and poverty of philosophical views that conceive of ethics solely as a domain for philosophical analysis. Further, there is increased interest in both ethics of virtue (the modeling or biographical approach advocated in Character Lessons; see MacIntyre 1984) and in ethics of need and love. Joseph Fletcher contrasts the latter with ethics of law and rights. "As seen from the ethical perspective," he notes, "the legalistic or moralistic temper gives the first-order position to rights, whereas the agapistic temper gives the first place to needs." (Fletcher 1975, p. 45). A blend of these views that tries to avoid both the elitism in Aristotle's ethics of virtue and the dogmatism of Christian agapism is found in the current feminist emphasis on ethics of caring, relation, and response (see Noddings 1984; Gilligan 1982).

As an ethical orientation, caring has often been characterized as feminine because it seems to arise more naturally out of woman's experience than man's. When this ethical orientation is reflected on and technically elaborated, we find that it is a form of what may be called relational ethics. A relational ethic remains tightly tied to experience because all its deliberations focus on the human beings involved in the situation under consideration and their relations to each other. A relation is here construed as any pairing or connection of individuals characterized by some affective awareness in each. It is an encounter or series of encounters in which the involved parties feel something toward each other. Relations may be characterized by love or hate, anger or sorrow, admiration or envy; or, of course, they may reveal mixed affects—one party feeling, say, love and the other revulsion. One who is concerned with behaving ethically strives always to preserve
or convert a given relation into a caring relation. This does not mean that all relations must approach that of the prototypical mother-child relation in either intensity or intimacy. On the contrary, an appropriate and particular form of caring must be found in every relation, and the behaviors and feelings that mark the mother-child relation are rarely appropriate for other relations; the characteristics of all caring relations can be described only at a rather high level of abstraction.

A relational ethic, an ethic of caring, differs dramatically from traditional ethics. The most important difference for our present purpose is that ethics of caring turn the traditional emphasis on duty upside down. Whereas Kant insisted that only those acts performed out of duty (in conformity to principle) should be labeled moral, an ethic of caring prefers acts done out of love and natural inclination. Acting out of caring, one calls on a sense of duty or special obligation only when love or inclination fails. Ethical agents adopting this perspective do not judge their own acts solely by their conformity to rule or principle, nor do they judge them only by the likely production of preassessed immoral goods such as happiness. While such agents may certainly consider both principles and utilities, their primary concern is the relation itself—not only what happens physically to others involved in the relation and in connected relations but what they may feel and how they may respond to the act under consideration. From a traditional perspective, it seems very odd to include the response of another in a judgment of our own ethical acts. Indeed, some consider the great achievement of Kantian ethics to be its liberation of the individual from the social complexities that characterized earlier ethics. A supremely lonely and heroic ethical agent marks both Kantian ethics and the age of individualism. An ethic of caring returns us to an earlier orientation—one that is directly concerned with the relations in which we all must live.

A relational ethic is rooted in and dependent on natural caring. Instead of striving away from affection and toward behavior always out of duty as Kant has prescribed, one acting from a perspective of caring moves consciously in the other direction; that is, he or she calls on a sense of obligation in order to stimulate natural caring. The superior state—one far more efficient because it energizes the giver as well as the receiver—is one of natural caring. Ethical caring is its servant. Because natural caring is both the source and the terminus of ethical caring, it is reasonable to use the mother-child relation as its prototype, so long as we keep in mind the caveats mentioned above.

The first member of the relational dyad (the carer or "one caring") responds to the needs, wants, and initiations of the second. Her mode of response is characterized by engramment (nonselective attention or
displacement of motivation (her motive energy flows in the direction of the other's needs and projects). She feels with the other and acts in his behalf. The second member (the one cared for) contributes to the relation by recognizing and responding to the caring. In the infant, this response may consist of smiles and wriggles; in the student, it may reveal itself in energetic pursuit of the student's own projects. A mature relationship may, of course, be mutual, and two parties may regularly exchange places in the relation, but the contributions of the one caring (whichever person may hold the position momentarily) remain distinct from those of the cared for. It is clear from this brief description why an ethic of caring is often characterized in terms of responsibility and response.

A view similar in many ways to that of caring may be found in Sara Ruddick's analysis of maternal thinking (Ruddick 1986). A mother, Ruddick says, puts her thinking into the service of three great interests: preserving the life of the child, fostering his growth, and shaping an acceptable child. Similarly, Milton Mayeroff describes caring in terms of fostering the growth of another (Mayeroff 1971). Thus, it is clear that at least some contemporary theorists recognize the thinking, practice, and skill required in the work traditionally done by women—work that has long been considered something anyone with a warm heart and little intellect could undertake. Caring as a rational moral orientation and maternal thinking with its threefold interests are richly applicable to teaching.

Caring and Instructional Arrangements

Even though the emphasis during this half of the twentieth century has been on intellectual goals—first, on advanced or deep structural knowledge of the disciplines and then, more modestly, on the so-called basics—a few educators and theorists have continued to suggest that schools must pay attention to the moral and social growth of their citizens. Ernest Boyer and his colleagues, for example, recommend that high school students engage in community service as part of their school experience (Boyer 1983). Theodore Sizer expresses concern about the impersonal relationships that develop between highly specialized teachers and students with whom they have only fleeting and technical contact, for example, in grading, recording attendance, disciplining (Sizer 1984). Lawrence Kohlberg and his associates concentrate explicitly on the just community that should be both the source and the end of a truly moral education (Kohlberg 1981, 1984). But none
of these concerns has captured either the national interest or that of educators in a way that might bring a mandate for significant change. The current emphasis remains on academic achievement. The influential reports of both the Holmes Group and the Carnegie Task Force, for example, almost entirely ignore the ethical aspects of education (Tomorrow's Teachers, 1986; A Nation Prepared, 1986). They mention neither the ethical considerations that should enter into teachers' choices of content, methods, and instructional arrangements nor the basic responsibility of schools to contribute to the moral growth of students.

If we were to explore seriously the ideas suggested by an ethic of caring for education, we might suggest changes in almost every aspect of schooling: the current hierarchical structure of management, the rigid mode of allocating time, the kind of relationships encouraged, the size of schools and classes, the goals of instruction, modes of evaluation, patterns of interaction, selection of content. Obviously all of these topics cannot be discussed here. I will therefore confine my analysis to the topic of relationships, which I believe is central to a thorough consideration of most of the other topics.

From the perspective of caring, the growth of those cared for is a matter of central importance. Feminists are certainly not the first to point this out. For John Dewey, for example, the centrality of growth implied major changes in the traditional patterns of schooling. In particular, since a major teaching function is to guide students in a well-informed exploration of areas meaningful to them, learning objectives must be mutually constructed by students and teachers (Dewey, 1938, 1963). Dewey was unequivocal in his insistence on the mutuality of this task. Teachers have an obligation to support, anticipate, evaluate, and encourage worthwhile activities, and students have a right to pursue projects mutually constructed and approved. It has long been recognized that Dewey's recommendations require teachers who are superbly well educated, people who know the basic fields of study so well that they can spot naive interests that hold promise for rigorous intellectual activity.

There is, however, more than intellectual growth at stake in the teaching enterprise. Teachers, like mothers, want to produce acceptable persons—persons who will support worthy institutions, live compassionately, work productively but not obsessively, care for older and younger generations, be admired, trusted, and respected. To shape such persons, teachers need not only intellectual capabilities but also a fund of knowledge about the particular persons with whom they are working. In particular, if teachers approach their responsibility for moral education from a caring orientation rather than an ethic of principle, they cannot teach moral education as one might teach geometry or European history or English; that is, moral education cannot be formulated into a course of study or set of principles to be learned. Rather, each student must be guided toward an ethical life—or, we might say, an ethical ideal—that is relationally constructed.

The relational construction of an ethical ideal demands significant contributions from the growing ethical agent and also from those in relation with this agent. There is, clearly, a large subjective component of such an ideal; modes of behavior must be evaluated as worthy by the person living them. But there is also a significant objective component, and this is contributed by the careful guidance of a host of persons who enter into relation with the developing agent. The teacher, for example, brings his or her own subjectivity into active play in the relation but also takes responsibility for directing the student's attention to the objective conditions of choice and judgment; both teacher and student are influenced by and influence the subjectivity of other agents. Hence, in a basic and crucial sense, each of us is a relationally defined entity and not a totally autonomous agent. Our goodness and our wickedness are both, at least in part, induced, supported, enhanced, or diminished by the interventions and influence of those with whom we are related.

In every human encounter, there arises the possibility of a caring occasion (see Watson, 1965). If I bump into you on the street, both of us are affected not only by the physical collision but also by what follows it. It matters whether I say, "Oh, dear, I'm so sorry," or "You fool! Can't you watch where you're going?" In every caring occasion, the parties involved must decide how they will respond to each other. Each such occasion involves negotiation of a sort: an initiation, a response, a decision to elaborate or terminate. Clearly, teaching is filled with caring occasions or, quite often, with attempts to avoid such occasions. Attempts to avoid caring occasions by the overuse of lecture without discussion, of impersonal grading in written, quantitative form, of modes of discipline that respond only to the behavior but refuse to encounter the person all risk losing opportunities for moral education and mutual growth.

Moral education, from the perspective of an ethic of caring, involves modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation. These components are not unique to ethics of caring, of course, but their combination and interpretation are central to this view of moral education (see Noddings, 1984). Teachers model caring when they steadfastly encourage responsible self-affirmation in their students. Such teachers are, of course, concerned with their students' academic achievement, but, more importantly, they are interested in the development of fully moral persons. This is not a zero-sum game. There is no reason why
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Excellent mathematics teaching cannot enhance ethical life as well. Because the emphasis in the present discussion is on human relationships, it should be noted that the teacher models not only admirable patterns of intellectual activity but also desirable ways of interacting with people. Such teachers treat students with respect and consideration and encourage them to treat each other in a similar fashion. They use teaching moments as caring occasions.

Dialogue is essential in this approach to moral education. True dialogue is open; that is, conclusions are not held by one or more of the parties at the outset. The search for enlightenment, or responsible choice, or perspective, or means to problem solution is mutual and marked by appropriate signs of reciprocity. This does not mean that participants in dialogue must give up any principles they hold and succumb to relativism. If I firmly believe that an act one of my students has committed is wrong, I do not enter a dialogue with him on whether or not the act is wrong. Such a dialogue could not be genuine. I can, however, engage him in dialogue about the possible justification for our opposing positions, about the likely consequences of such acts to himself and others, about the personal history of my own belief. I can share my reflections with him, and he may exert considerable influence on me by pointing out that I have not suffered the sort of experience that led him to his act. Clearly, time is required for such dialogue. Teacher and student must know each other well enough for trust to develop.

The caring teacher also wants students to have practice in caring. This suggests changes beyond the well-intended inclusion of community service in high school graduation requirements. Service, after all, can be rendered in either caring or noncaring ways. In a classroom dedicated to caring, students are encouraged to support each other; opportunities for peer interaction are provided, and the quality of that interaction is as important (to both teacher and students) as the academic outcomes. Small group work may enhance achievement in mathematics, for example, and can also provide caring occasions. The object is to develop a caring community through modeling, dialogue, and practice.

Although modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation are all important, the component I wish to emphasize here is confirmation. In caring or maternal thinking, we often use caring occasions to confirm the cared for. The idea here is to shape an acceptable child by assisting in the construction of his ethical ideal. He has a picture of a good self, and we, too, have such a picture. But as adults we have experience that enables us to envision and appreciate a great host of wonderful selves—people with all sorts of talents, projects, ethical strengths, and weaknesses kept courageously under control. As we come to understand what the child wants to be and what we can honestly approve in him, we know what to encourage. We know how to respond to his acts—both those we approve and those we disapprove. When he does something of which we disapprove, we can often impute a worthy motive for an otherwise unworthy act. Indeed, this is a central aspect of confirmation. "When we attribute the best possible motive consonant with reality to the cared-for, we confirm him; that is, we reveal to him an attainable image of himself that is lovelier than that manifested in his present acts. In an important sense, we embrace him as one with us in devotion to caring. In education, what we reveal to a student about himself as an ethical and intellectual being has the power to nurture the ethical ideal or to destroy it" (Noddings 1984, p. 193).

Confirmation is of such importance in moral education that we must ask about the settings in which it can effectively take place. Educators often come close to recognizing the significance of confirmation in a simplistic way. We talk about the importance of expectations, for example, and urge teachers to have high expectations for all their students. But, taken as a formula, this is an empty exhortation. If, without knowing a student—what he loves, strives for, fears, hopes—I merely expect him to do uniformly well in everything I present to him, I treat him like an unreflective animal. A high expectation can be a mark of respect, but so can a relatively low one. If a mathematics teacher knows, for example, that one of her students, Rose, is talented in art and wants more than anything to be an artist, the teacher may properly lower her expectations for Rose in math. Indeed, she and Rose may consciously work together to construct a mathematical experience for Rose that will honestly satisfy the institution, take as little of Rose's effort as possible, and preserve the teacher's integrity as a mathematics teacher. Teacher and student may chat about art, and the teacher may learn something. They will surely talk about the requirements of the art schools to which Rose intends to apply—their GPA demands, how much math they require, and the like. Teacher and student become partners in fostering the student's growth. The student accepts responsibility for both completion of the work negotiated and the mutually constructed decision to do just this much mathematics. This is illustrative of responsible self-affirmation. The picture painted here is so vastly different from the one pressed on teachers currently that it seems almost alien. To confirm in this relational fashion, teachers need a setting different from those we place them in today.

To be responsible participants in the construction of ethical ideals, teachers need more time with students than we currently allow them. If we cared deeply about fostering growth and shaping both acceptable and caring people, we could surely find ways to extend contact between
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What must be maintained, it seems, are the problems, and the more complex the better, for then all sorts of experts are required, and, as the problems proliferate (proliferation by definition is especially efficient), still more experts are needed. Helpers come to have an investment in the helping system and their own place in it rather than in the empowerment of their clients.1

I have discussed here just one major change that can be rather easily accomplished in establishing settings more conducive to caring and, thus, to moral education. Such a change would induce further changes, for, when we begin to think from this perspective, everything we do in teaching comes under reevaluation. In the fifties, the nation moved toward larger high schools, in part because the influential Conant report persuaded us that only sufficiently large schools could supply the sophisticated academic programs that the nation wanted to make its first priority (Conant 1959). Now we might do well to suggest smaller schools that might allow us to embrace older priorities, newly critiqued and defined, and work toward an educational system proudly oriented toward the development of decent, caring, loved, and loving persons.

What Research Can Contribute

If it is not already obvious, let me say explicitly that I think university educators and researchers are part of the problem. Our endless focus on narrow achievement goals, our obsession with sophisticated schemes of evaluation and measurement directed (naturally enough) at things that are relatively easy to measure, our reinforcement of the mad desire to be number one—to compete, to win awards, to acquire more and more of whatever is currently valued—in all these ways we contribute to the proliferation of problems and malaise.

Can researchers play a more constructive role? Consider some possibilities. First, by giving some attention to topics involving affective growth, character, social relations, sharing, and the pursuit of individual projects, researchers can give added legitimacy to educational goals in all these areas. A sign of our neglect is the almost total omission of such topics from the 987 pages of the third Handbook of Research on Teaching (Wittrock 1986). Second, researchers can purposefully seek out situations in which educators are trying to establish settings more conducive to moral growth and study these attempts at some length, over a broad range of goals, and with constructive appreciation. That last phrase, "with constructive appreciation," suggests a third way in
which researchers might help to solve problems rather than aggravate them. In a recent article on fidelity, I argued:

In educational research, fidelity to persons counsels us to choose our problems in such a way that the knowledge gained will promote individual growth and maintain the caring community. It is not clear that we are sufficiently concerned with either criterion at present. William Torbert, for example, has noted that educational research has been oddly uneducational and suggests that one reason for this may be the failure of researchers to engage in collaborative inquiry (see Torbert 1981). There is a pragmatic side to this problem, of course, but from an ethical perspective, the difficulty may be identified as a failure to meet colleagues in genuine mutuality. Researchers have perhaps too often made persons (teachers and students) the objects of research. An alternative is to choose problems that interest and concern researchers, students, and teachers... [Noddings 1986, p. 508]

Here, again, feminists join thinkers like Torbert to endorse modes of research that are directed at the needs rather than the shortcomings and peculiarities of subjects. Dorothy Smith, a sociologist of knowledge, has called for a science for women rather than about women; "that is," she says, "a sociology which does not transform those it studies into objects but preserves in its analytic procedures the presence of the subject as actor and experiencer. Subject then is that knower whose grasp of the world may be enlarged by the work of the sociologist" (Smith 1981, p. 1).

Similarly, research for teaching would concern itself with the needs, views, and actual experience of teachers rather than with the outcomes produced through various instructional procedures. This is not to say that contrasting methods should not be studied, but, when they are studied, researchers should recognize that the commitment of teachers may significantly affect the results obtained through a given method. Research for teaching would not treat teachers as interchangeable parts in instructional procedures, but, rather, as professionals capable of making informed choices among proffered alternatives.

Research for teaching would address itself to the needs of teachers—much as pharmaceutical research addresses itself to the needs of practicing physicians. This suggests that research and development should become partners in education, as they have in industry. Instead of bemoaning the apparent fact that few teachers use small group methods, for example, researchers could ask teachers what they need to engage in such work comfortably. One answer to this might be materials. Researchers often assume that the answer is training, because this answer better fits their own preparation and research timetables. If materials are needed, however, the partnership of research and development becomes crucial.

Qualitative researchers may suppose that their methods are more compatible with research for teaching than the usual quantitative methods. Indeed, Margaret Mead said of fieldwork: "Anthropological research does not have subjects. We work with informants in an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect" (Mead 1969, p. 371). But qualitative researchers, too, can forget that they are part of an educational enterprise that should support a caring community. Qualitative studies that portray teachers as stupid, callous, indifferent, ignorant, or dogmatic do little to improve the conditions of teaching or teachers. I am not arguing that no teachers are stupid, callous, indifferent, and so forth. Rather, I am arguing that teachers so described are sometimes betrayed by the very researchers to whom they have generously given access. What should we do when we come upon gross ignorance or incompetence? One of my colleagues argues strongly that it is our duty to expose incompetence. Would you keep silent if you observed child abuse? he asks. The answer to this is, of course, that we cannot remain silent about child abuse, and it is conceivable that some events we observe as researchers are so dangerous or worrisome that we simply must report them. But at that point, I would say, our research ends. We feel compelled to take up our duties as responsible citizens and to relinquish our quest for knowledge. So long as we seek knowledge in classrooms, we are necessarily dependent on the teachers and students who are there engaged in a constitutively ethical enterprise. To intrude on that, to betray the trust that lets us in, to rupture the possibility of developing a caring community, is to forget that we should be doing research for teaching.

Does this mean that we cannot report failures in the classrooms we study? Of course not. But just as we ask teachers to treat the success and failure of students with exquisite sensitivity, we should study teacher success and failure generously and report on it constructively. Teachers may be eager to explore their own failures if their successes are also acknowledged and if the failures are thoroughly explored to locate the preconditions and lack responsible for them. Teachers, too, need confirmation.

Conclusion

I have suggested that moral education has long been and should continue to be a primary concern of educational institutions. To ap
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proach moral education from the perspective of caring, teachers, teacher-educators, students, and researchers need time to engage in modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation. This suggests that ways be explored to increase the contact between teachers and students and between researchers and teachers, so that collaborative inquiry may be maintained and so that relationships may develop through which all participants are supported in their quest for better ethical selves.

Notes

1. This is a question that was seriously asked by Carl Bereiter in 1975. See Bereiter 1975.
2. See the vivid and well-documented description of this attitude in Maguire 1978, pp. 424–29.
3. Bernard Williams (1985), e.g., argues that philosophy plays a limited role in the re-creation of ethical life. Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), too, argues that morality and ethics belong primarily to the domain of social experience and that philosophy must proceed from there.
4. Daniel C. Maguire (1978) has also described approaches to relational ethics.
5. For a fuller analysis of the roles of each, see Noddings 1984.
6. Paolo Freire (1970) describes as oppression any situation in which one person hinders another in “his pursuit of self-affirmation as a responsible person.”
7. For a discussion of this unhappy result, see Freire 1970; see also Sartre 1949.

References

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